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In 1992 Alice Kessler-Harris wrote a piece for American Quarterly in an 
attempt to find a mediate position for American Studies in the debate be- 
tween cultural pluralism and American national identity. For Kessler-Har- 
ris multiculturalism is best understood as part of a process of redefinition 
of an inherited, static and exhausted "shared" American identity. The crit- 
ical attention given to the flowering of multiple identities is not inevitably 
an invitation "to abandon the concept of American identity." It may be un- 
derstood, rather, as a process of "questioning" which "encourages us to en- 
ter into a new conversation about whether there is still a 'we' at the heart of 
American culture and to wonder how that 'we' is constituted . . ..'>I The re- 
defining process, she pointed out in a familiar argument, was necessitated 
by the 'silencing' of female and minority voices, "silences" that in effect 
underwrote the liberal national narrative which American Studies had 
helped to construct in the 1940s. And the attempt to reimpose consensus by 
contemporary conservatives, understandable as an attempt to recover a lost 
sense of community or cultural unity, is deplorable in its imposition of a 
static tradition, a sense of America "as fixed and given." 
Kessler-Harris's piece addresses one of the mainstays of cultural studies 
(and postmodern politics) - the rise of ethnic particularism often defined 
(positively and negatively) as aggressively anti-nation-state. Working 
against this context, Kessler-Harris attempts to ground multiculturalism in 
1 Alice Kessler-Harris, "Cultural Locations: Positioning American Studies in the Great Debate," Anzericaiz 
Quarterly 44 (September 1992): pp. 299-312, 307, 309. 
a larger process of national redefinition. She does not propose theoretical 
foundations for this process of redefinition, suggesting rather an open, 
pragmatic process of reappraisal and reconstruction, with the implication 
that this process can revive and re-form established political institutions. 
While I find this position hopeful, the question remains: what are the pro- 
cesses (political and cultural) around which such a reconstruction might 
occur? In this paper, I will suggest that in imagining this process, it should 
not, cannot, be understood in the terms proposed by contemporary cultural 
studies. The problem is that without a more explicitly drawn out political 
and historical context, "the process of revising and expanding the myths of 
American life to include more  voice^"^ can lead only to confusion. 
The Virtues of the "Old Historicism" 
A good example of the limits of cultural criticism as a means of social 
reconstruction is apparent in the rise of "new historicism" as a critical 
movement. Distinguishing itself from earlier historically-oriented criti- 
cism, new historicists dismiss these "old historicists" for their supposed 
presentation of "a neutral or unproblematic context against which to 
interpret [problematic] literary  text^."^ The problem supposedly is that 
old historicists paid no heed to the suppression of subaltern classes and 
social groups which are now the stuff of new historicist criticism. This is 
a valid point. On the other hand, as problematic as this old historicist 
approach was, it also permitted a kind of engagement with political 
'events and socio-economic realities that we have now lost in cultural 
s t ud i e~ .~  And though the historical past was simplified - in order, I 
suppose, to find a ground for the Anglo-American myth - old historicists 
2 Quotation drawn from Paul Christensen, "Conference Proposal: The Re-Mythologizing of America," for 
a conference held at the University of Oslo, May 3-4, 1997. 
3 Richard Grusin, "Introduction [New American Studies in Science and Technology]," Co~$igurntio~zs 3
(1995), pp. 349-51. 
4 American Studies has increasingly followed a cultural studies approach. My preference is that American 
Studies should draw on cultural discourses and read them in relation to geography, world systems theory, 
urban planning and history. 
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avoided what Murray Krieger calls an over-powering and acidic "herme- 
neutics of suspicion" so common to literary and cultural criticism todaya5 
Rather than interminable subversion, old historicists like Alfred Kazin 
sought, as Giles Gunn puts it, "out of admiration, or at least out of hope, 
to salvage and recuperate the past."6 Robert Westbrook argues that the 
cultural criticisms posed by many of us today often end up, by contrast, 
as a "deeply quiescent invitation to conceive of ours as a repressive 
culture with no exit and no genuinely critical resources of its 
In On Native Grounds Alfred Kazin recovers some of those resources 
for his time. One of his themes concerns the efforts of journalists, WPA 
writers and critics in the 1930s and 1940s to "recover America as [a unify- 
ing] idea." The foundation of this mythic impulse, Kazin asserts, was the 
response to the Great Depression itself: "Out of a decade of unrelieved cri- 
sis and failure, out of the desire to assess what could be lmown and to es- 
tablish a needed security in the American inheritance, came the realization 
of how little American writing had served the people and how little it had 
come to grips with the subject at hand - the country i t~e l f . "~  For Kazin the 
literature of the 1930s was grounded in the crisis of society and repres- 
ented a resource that permitted the re-imaging of American life. And when 
in the 1940s this re-imagining of America turned into an admittedly shal- 
low and "unabashed recovery of an American mythology," this too, Kazin 
says, was an understandable response to historical events. 
"Old Historicism" Re-Historicized 
The re-visioning of America was complete by the end of the war. The 
American myth and its ideological companion, American exception- 
alism, were re-in~tituted.~ Having carried out significant internal reforms 
5 Murray Krieger, The Institution of Theory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1994). 
6 Quoted in Robert B. Westbrook, "A New Pragmatism," Review of Thinking across the American Grain: 
Ideology, Intellect, and the New Prag7natisnz, by Giles Gunn (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992) in 
American Quarterly 45 (September 1993): pp. 438-444,442. 
7 Ibid., p. 442. 
8 Alfred Kazin, On Native Grounds: An Interpretation of Modern American Prose Literature (New York: 
Doubleday Anchor, 1956; orig. pub., 1942), pp. 398, 381. 
and then having fought off the world-wide threat of fascism, "America" 
was re-legitimized. Under such historical circumstances, it was not un- 
believable or sentimental for a critic like Kazin to acknowledge a certain 
validity in "the emotional discovery of America the country that once 
more became, as Jefferson had long ago said, 'this government: the 
world's best last hope' ."lo 
But as John L. Thomas makes clear the literary and imaginative and 
critical responses to the crises of this era did not reflect unproblematic 
political responses. The re-mythologizing of America during the New 
Deal period actually began as a critical cultural studies centered around 
ideas and visions of regionalism.ll But by the late 1930s these region- 
alisms were truncated in response to the crisis of civilization brought on 
by the fascist regimes. Regionalists like Lewis Mumford and Van Wyck 
Brooks became nationalists. 
Thomas provides us with an interesting point about the relationship 
between literature, criticism and society. What emerged through the liter- 
ary and critical imagination - a more particularist, specifically regionalist 
representation of America - neither determined, nor mirrored the dom- 
inant political discourse. In the political environment of the 1930s, 
characterized by demands for State centralization and economic plan- 
ning, regionalism was made to serve nationalist ends: the Worlcs Progress 
Administration (WPA) rebuilt the national infrastructure, at the same 
time that WPA artists struggled to give expression to the regional 
traditions and possibilities of the landscapes and cityscapes effected by 
reconstruction. But by the early 1940s, the force of events set off by the 
international political crisis overwhelmed the pragmatic validity of "re- 
9 Michael Karnmen, "The Problem of American Exceptionalism: A Reconsideration," American Quarterly 
45 (March 1993): 29. When America was first mythologized as an exceptional nation it was understood as 
having defeated "history ": to have become an exception to the rule of power (later understood as the conflict 
of class) that seemed to define the narrow parameters of modern history. The exceptionalist myth was used for 
explicitly ideological reasons during the Gilded Age where it emerged in the discourse of "Americanization" 
which, among other uses, justified scientific management and business unionism. With the temporary collapse 
of what Van Wyck Brooks called "a business civilization" in 1929, there was a real opening for a critical 
challenge to established notions of American identity. See also the special issue of Ainerican Studies in 
Scaizdiizavia on exceptionalism, 29:2 (Fall, 1997). 
10 Kazin, p. 394. 
11 John L. Thomas, "The Uses of Catastrophism: Lewis Mumford, Vernon L. Parrington, Van Wyck 
Brooks, and the End of American Regionalism," Ainerican Quarterly 42 (June 1990): pp. 223-251. 
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gionalist cultural representations" and helped establish a cultural na- 
tionalism which would grow ever more strident during the Cold War era. 
Postmodern Responses 
Little wonder that Alan Trachtenberg has pointed out that postmodern 
cultural studies has sought to avoid cultural nationalism and parochialism 
by staying "resolutely focused on dissolving all ideologies, on uncover- 
ing and denying all structures of power hidden within cultural sym- 
bologies."12 But as this postmodern project, the de-mythologizing of 
America, proceeds, it both reflects and contributes to the destabilizing of 
social identities and the delegitimizing of the (national) state.13 Post- 
modernism makes the case for particularities (ethnic, gender, racial), by 
arguing that the notion of a common historical project is merely a 
construction built on a meta-narrative which ruthlessly suppresses par- 
ticularity. This oppositional perspective makes framing politics - and 
politics requires, after all, the ability to imagine how power could be 
wielded - impossible. "We" are left with an oppositional stance: the new 
buzz words are "local knowledge" and "from below," which in theory 
may become part of a new politics. But the very form by which such 
"knowledge" is conceived - that is, as oppositional, negative and entirely 
subjective - makes it irrelevant to the process of turning local know- 
ledges into political opposition which can be organized to wield actual 
power. Is this postmodern stance so different from the old romantic 
notion of cultural transformation, "the idea that spiritual transformation 
must precede - or even displace - social revolution ..." ? I 4  
12 Trachtenbeg, foreword to Casey Blake, Beloved Co7lznzu7zity (Chapel Hill: North Carolina, 1990). 
13 In "The Idiocy of American Studies," Anzerican Quartevly 43 (1991): pp. 625-660, 652, Steven Watts 
argues that postmodern politics do not really challenge mainstream American culture, which is built on "an 
interlocking network of corporate liberal politics, consumer capitalism, bureaucratic social structures, and a 
therapeutic ethic of personality growth and self-realization." 
14 Blake, Beloved Conznzunity, p. 35, mentions precedents going back to Emerson and Thoreau, Blake and 
Tolstoy. 
The Political Inadequacies of Postmodern Responses 
Today the politics of the monied professional class grows in the space 
created by the de-mythologizing of America. The basic (political) 
problem with recent moves to include more voices, a necessary part of 
the process of reconstruction, is that the resulting multiplicity of cultural 
representations are often celebrated as a triumph of democratic ex- 
pression, obscuring the fact that participation in the real decision-making 
processes is being simultaneously contracted. We have a growing crisis 
of inequality in western societies, a social world increasingly divided 
between the privileged educated class and everyone else. The crisis is 
rooted in the economic responses to the stagnation of industrial eco- 
nomies that began in the early 1970s. One result (perhaps even, purpose) 
of the post-1973 restructuring, which began with deregulation and pro- 
ceeded with the shrinking of the welfare state, was to impose market 
discipline on recalcitrant populations inside the United States. Another 
consequence is that relative to privileged groups, the majority of the 
population has suffered a decline in their standard of living. Rising 
inequality presents a grim prospect for a free society. 
The politics of our era, as they've emerged in the US, seems to me to 
rest on an odd symbiosis between a liberal cultural politics and a reac- 
tionary social politics - perhaps best seen in the issue of African-Amer- 
ican identity and the black vote. Some multiculturalists want political 
boundaries and modes of representation to be drawn along racial lines. 
The resulting black districts find approval among conservatives as a way 
to culturally isolate African-Americans. Identity politics - the most 
visible form of postmodern politics around - no longer contests the estab- 
'lished center of power. This center of power was identified as early as the 
1820s by Andrew Jacltson, who understood the power of organized 
money in American society, and the possibility that through political 
organization ordinary people could contest that power. The argument that 
organized politics, the traditional contest between organized money 
versus organized people, could be superseded by the politics of identity 
has an uncanny similarity to the 1950s liberal end of ideology school.15 
15 Daniel Bell, Tlze E~zd of Ideology (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960) 
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The argument went something like this: The central issue of western 
politics since the Renaissance has been the distribution of wealth; the 
triumph of reason is the elimination of the distribution problem, ending 
the need for old ideologies and opening new political directions which 
will be based on the interactions of different interest-groups. It seems to 
me that the implications of identity politics assume that these structures - 
the alleviation of scarcity and the efficacy of interest-group politics - are 
in place. They're not. 
Reassertion of Old Politics? 
Issues of distribution have burst back on the scene and are likely to 
become an increasingly important aspect of American and world social 
systems. For a while this was the staple of fading social democratic 
intellectuals, but ever since Kevin Phillips published The Politics of Rich 
and Poor in 1990 questions of wealth distribution have become a 
mainstream issue.16 Though Phillips' book was too narrow in its analysis, 
fitting recent events entirely into the history of American politics, it did 
much to re-open the issue of economic justice for public discussion. 
Consequently, we are seeing, among other things, a revival of muck- 
raking, a sure indication of middle-class angst. More importantly, a sur- 
prising re-reading of American history has emerged among a few public 
intellectuals. One of the most interesting is offered by Michael Lind, who 
advocates ignoring cultural politics altogether, in order to reassert a new 
version of liberal nationalism as the best hope to deal with issues of 
distribution and fragmentation.17 
Lind's The Next American Nation is a very convincing book for two 
reasons: it effectively counters multicultural myths about the persistence 
16 Barry Bluestone & Bennett Harrison, The Deiizdustvializilzg of Anzerica: Plant Closings, Conznzunity 
Abaizdonnzelzt & the Disiizantlilzg of Basic Iizdustly (New York: Basic Books, 1982); Kevin Phillips, Tlze 
Politics of Riclz and Poor (New York: Random House, 1990). 
17 Michael Lind, Tlze Next Anzericaiz Natioiz: The New Nationalis~iz aizd the Fourth American Revolutioiz 
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995). 
of ethnic pluralism with hard evidence about intermarriage and other 
signs of a continuing Americanization process that encompasses the 
majority of the population. The purpose of retrieving the "melting pot" is 
to recover an American national character and identity. Second, Lind 
combines a frank assessment of the "overclass" - the professional and 
managerial class - with a hopeful re-reading of American history: his call 
for a "fourth republic" is an attempt to reassert the liberal state at the 
center of a national polity committed to correcting the inequalities of the 
capitalist system. 
It's interesting that both Lind and Phillips call for the resurgence of a 
(very mild) reformist Left on the model of middle class progressivism 
and that both of these commentators began on the political right (Lind 
has more fully renounced his rightist credentials). Have they changed 
their political perspectives or is there a reason why conservatives would 
advocate this position? One answer to this question comes in the form of 
a statement made by the Marxist historical geographer, Immanuel 
Wallerstein, in his essay, Capitalist Civilization. Wallerstein points out 
that prior to its breakdown amidst the triumph of market ideology in the 
1980s, the Left, in all its manifestations (the socialist states, the national 
liberation movements of the third world, and the Keynesian-social demo- 
cratic systems of the advanced world) constituted a force for adjustment 
and legitimation of the world economic system. Consequently, he says: 
"From the point of view of the capitalist world-system, this collapse of 
left strategy has been a disaster, since far from being revolutionary the 
classical left strategy has served as part of the integrating glue of 
capitalist civilization."18 Phillips and Lind are traditionalists hoping that 
yesteryear's reformism can restore the luster - that is to say the 
legitimacy - of the national State in hopes of preserving the system. 
18 Immanuel Wallerstein, Historical Capitalism with Capitalist Civilization (London: Verso, 1995), p. 151. 
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Lasch: Populist Traditionalism, Pragmatism and History 
Christopher Lasch's The Revolt of the Elites, shares something with 
Phillips' and Land's work: he wants to recover an American past. But the 
past he admires is not that of mainstream American politics. Party 
politics is irrelevant, he asserts, because the traditional left-right spec- 
trum cannot address the fundamental issues of personality and culture 
with which we are confronted. We suffer from a fragmentation of the 
(collective) personality. Lasch's conservatism is expressed in his 
fundamental critique of the myth of progress and "growth," the founda- 
tion for most modern ideologies, including liberalism and Marxism.lg 
Economic growth and ecological destruction, he argues, are the ne- 
cessary accompaniments to a collective personality rooted in "progress" 
and the therapeutic adjustment to a capitalist consumer culture. Lasch 
objects to the transition from the nineteenth-century conception of 
"character" to twentieth-century therapeutic culture, with its shibboleth 
of personal growth. But he offers us much more than criticism. Lasch's 
re-reading of American history, with attention to the question of 
structures of power and the movements opposed to them, makes it 
possible to look at the American past and see resources of hope in the 
idea of civic individualism, in the history of populism and aspects of the 
labor movement. 
Lasch reveals history through moments of decision. Choices existed; 
decisions were made. History in this sense concerns values and modes of 
representation, but it also raises what C. Wright Mills calls "the basic 
problem of power": "the problem of who is involved in making [de- 
c i s ion~] ." ~~  With his attention to the alternative politics of the American 
past - in particular republican and populist political traditions, Lasch 
suggests that conceptions of politics and culture long since forgotten 
offer important insights and critical perspective on our current situation. 
But in other respects, his work is troubling not only because he seems in 
tone to reject the present, but also because his own pre-modern assault on 
modernity undermines what in other moments is Lasch's - and I must 
19 Christopher Lasch, The True and Only Heaven (New York: Norton, 1991); The Revolt ofthe Elites (New 
York: Norton, 1995). 
20 C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 40. 
add my own - greatest hope, that of finding a cultural criticism and a 
politics capable of pragmatically re-assessing current social and political 
arrangements in line, at least in part, with the following prescription 
offered by Mills: "what chances, if any, [do] men [and women] of 
different positions in differing types of society have, first, by their reason 
and experience, to transcend their everyday milieu, and second, by virtue 
of their power, to act with consequence for the structure of their society 
and their periods [of time]. These are the problems of the role of reason in 
history."21 
21 Ibid., pp. 184-185 
